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Abstract 
 
A widely cited result asserts that experts’ superiority over novices in recalling 
meaningful material from their domain of expertise vanishes when random 
material is used. A review of recent chess experiments where random positions 
served as control material (presentation time between 3 and 10 seconds) shows, 
however, that strong players generally maintain some superiority over weak 
players even with random positions, although the relative difference between skill 
levels is much smaller than with game positions.  The implications of this finding 
for expertise in chess are discussed and the question of the recall of random 
material in other domains is raised. 
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Recall of rapidly presented random chess positions  
is a function of skill 
 
 A classical result in the study of expertise is that experts are better than 
non-experts at memorizing meaningful material from their domain of expertise, 
but lose their superiority when the material is randomized. This result was first 
obtained in the study of chess memory (Chase and Simon, 1973a; Jongman and 
Lemmens, cited in Vicente & De Groot, 1990), and has since been widely cited in 
cognitive psychology textbooks (e.g. Anderson, 1990; Lesgold, 1988), and hailed 
as one of the cornerstones of the study of expertise (Saariluoma, 1989). The basic 
relation between skill and meaningfulness has been replicated in various domains, 
although wide variations in the presentation time of the stimuli make quantitative 
comparisons difficult: Go (Reitman, 1976); bridge (Engle & Bukstel, 1978; 
Charness, 1979); Othello (Wolff, Mitchell & Frey, 1984); electronics (Egan & 
Schwarz, 1979); computer programs (McKeithen, Reitman, Rueter & Hirtle, 
1981); basketball (Allard, Graham & Paarsalu, 1980). Some studies, however,  
have found that experts keep their superiority over novices when the material is 
memory for randomized sequences of pitch symbols (Sloboda, 1976) and dance 
sequences (Allard & Starkes, 1991). 
 A complete lack of difference in memory for random material between 
experts and non-experts is somewhat counter-intuitive.  Simon and Chase (1973) 
have proposed that 10,000 hours, about ten years, of intense practice and study are 
necessary to reach a high level of expertise.  During their practice and study time 
experts have undoubtedly met with many situations that are close to “random,” 
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that is, that contain some infrequently observed features. In the frame of Chase 
and Simon’s (1973b) chunking theory, one could expect that the numerous chunks 
they have stored in LTM, including some of these unusual features, would allow 
them to recognize, more often than weak players, familiar chunks that occur 
adventitiously in random positions, thereby obtaining an advantage in recall. It is 
also possible that strong players have developed strategies to cope with 
uncommon situations, which do occur sometimes in their practice. In addition, 
their familiarity with the materials (for example, in board games, better 
knowledge of the topology of the board and its attributes) could give them some 
advantage in comparison with non-experts.  
 In this paper, we re-examine the recall of random material as a function of 
level of expertise, emphasizing the chess domain mainly because many empirical 
data are available there, and because the ELO1 scale allows players to be ranked 
much more precisely than just as "experts" and "novices," as is the case in other 
research domains on expertise. We shall see that there has been some 
oversimplification of the empirical findings on recall of random chess positions, 
in the way of ignoring small, but statistically significant, effects.  
 
 While random positions have been used mainly as a control of subjects’ 
“general” (non-domain-specific) memory capacity, some researchers have studied 
them for their own sake.  For example, Holding and Reynolds (1982) used semi-
random positions to study problem solving in chess and Reynolds (1982) has 
shown that different degrees of “randomness” may be obtained by manipulating 
the amount of control that the pieces have over the center.   
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 Some studies have found skill differences in recall performance when the  
presentation time is sufficiently long. Djakow, Petrowski, and Rudik (1927) 
presented for one minute a “random” position to Masters and to subjects in a non-
chessplaying control group, and found that Masters’ recall was better than control 
group subjects’. However, two difficulties cloud the interpretation of this study. 
First, the subjects of the control group did not play chess at all, hence may have 
been wholly unfamiliar with the material. Second, the position was a chess 
problem.  Chess problems are specially constructed situations where the first goal 
is to construct esthetic positions and combinations. Although this species of chess 
is quite different from normal chess games, it employs positions that are far from 
random. Lories (1987) found an effect of skill with one-minute presentation of the 
semi-random positions2 generated by Holding and Reynolds (1982).  
 In addition, Saariluoma (1989) used a procedure similar to Chase and 
Ericsson’s (1982) for the memory of digits, dictating positions at the pace of 2 or 
4 seconds per piece. He found that strong players are better in the recall of both 
game and random positions. Finally, Goldin (1979) and Saariluoma (1984) 
showed that skilled players perform better than less skilled players in a 
recognition task, both with game and random positions and both with long 
presentation times (no limit in the study time in Goldin, 1979) and short 
presentation times (8 seconds in Saariluoma, 1984). 
 While it is agreed that Masters do better with random positions in some 
special memory tasks, like those studied by Saariluoma (1989), the general view 
among students of expert memory has been that there is no difference in recall 
with the standard presentation time of five seconds (see for example Cooke, Atlas, 
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Lane, & Berger, 1993; Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Holding, 1985). However,  an 
analysis of  data from various experiments in the literature that used recall of 
random positions as a control condition makes it clear that strong players show 
rather reliably a superiority over weaker players. Table 1 lists all the experiments 
we have found bearing on this question, with the additional criteria that the 
presentation time should be at most 10 seconds, that the mean number of pieces 
per position should be at least twenty,3 and that the positions used should be 
generated by a truly random procedure (see footnote 2). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 In all cases, except in Chase and Simon’s (1973a) study, recall 
performance increases monotonically as a function of skill. The F-, t- or p-values 
are not systematically reported in these studies, so we cannot use such meta-
analytical approaches as combining tests or computing the overall effect size. We 
observe, however, that the strongest skill group outperforms the weakest in 12 
cases out of 13. Assuming a binomial distribution and equal probability of the 
strongest group performing better or worse than the weakest, the probability of the 
strongest group outperforming the weakest in twelve or more cases  is .0017.  
Alternatively, we can analyze the data in Table 1 using a randomized block 
design, with skill level as independent variable and experiment as blocking 
variable. Again, skill levels differ reliably [F(3, 17) = 10.35, MSe  = 0.97,  p < 
.001]. Note finally that the type of reconstruction--board and pieces, dictation, or 
  Skilled chessplayers and random positions 
  7 
computer display-- does not influence performance [F(2, 27) = 0.90,  MSe  = 2.54, 
ns.]. 
 We see that for each experiment, with the exception of Chase and Simon’s 
results (1973a) where the Master performed worse than the novice, the more 
skilled players do remember more pieces on random boards than the less skilled. 
That these differences were in most cases not statistically significant may be 
explained both by the small size of the effect and the small number of subjects in 
these experiments. In a study (Gobet & Simon, 1995) aimed at extending the 
present findings, the presentation time was systematically varied from one second 
to 60 seconds. It was found that skill differences were present at all presentation 
times, although they were larger with long presentation times. 
 We must deal at the outset with a plausible explanation for this skill 
difference, suggested to us by Neil Charness: that chess masters guess better and 
more than novices. That strong players guess better with random material is not 
likely, as Jongman (1968) found that strong players were not better than weaker 
players in guessing the zero-order probabiliy of piece location in game positions. 
Whether strong players guess more can be checked against the number of errors of 
commission they make. As data on errors of commission are not available for all 
the studies listed in Table 1, we will restrict our analysis to experiments run by 
our research group. In Gobet and Simon (in press-b), Masters, Experts, and Class 
A players committed, on average 2.4, 5.5 and 3.9 errors of commission with 
random positions presented for 5 second each. The differences were not 
significant statistically. In Gobet and Simon (1995), where the presentation time 
was varied from 1 sec to 60 sec, players of all skill levels tended to make more 
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errors of commission with longer presentation times, and Masters tended to make 
fewer errors of commission than Experts and Class A players. Again, the 
differences were not statistically significant. With five seconds, the respective 
errors of commission were 1.0, 3.1, 3.4, for Masters, Experts, and Class A players, 
respectively. Based on these data and on Jongman's results, we can safely reject 
the hypothesis that the differences we found were due to stronger players guessing 
more or better than weaker players. 
 Thus, while randomization does severely reduce the recall of strong 
players, it does not destroy completely their superiority over weaker players. Note 
that this skill difference in recall with random positions is small (roughly one 
piece per additional 400 ELO points), much less than for the recall of game 
positions, where an increase of 400 ELO points yields typically an increase of 
about five pieces. Figure 1, which summarize the data of Table 1 and gives the 
mean number of pieces correct for the game positions obtained in the same 
experiments, makes it clear that the slopes are different in the two cases. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
 Does this finding impair the prevailing theory that experts’ superiority of 
recall (especially with game positions) rests on their superior store of chess 
knowledge?  We conclude that it does not. First, the few studies that have 
investigated the general cognitive abilities of chessplayers outside the domain of 
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chess (see Cranberg and Albert, 1988, De Groot, [1946] 1978,  or Gobet, 1993, 
for reviews) have found no superiority for chessplayers in comparison with non-
chessplayers, nor is there a correlation between level of skill and general cognitive 
abilities. For example, Djakow et al. (1927), subjected top-level masters to a 
battery of psychological tests, including a visual memory test using 8x8 matrices 
having or not having a resemblance to chess boards. Masters performed better 
than control subjects when tests involved chess material, but not in tests unrelated 
to chess. (A later exception is the subject VP studied by Hunt and Love, 1972, 
who was both a mnemonist and a strong chessplayer.) 
 Second, the skill difference with random positions is predicted by Chase 
and Simon’s (1973b) chunking theory, because Masters, having a larger repertoire 
of chunks in LTM, are more likely to find rare patterns in LTM than weaker 
players.4 This is confirmed by  computer simulations  (Gobet and Simon, in press-
b), where the program's recall of random positions increased logarithmically as a 
function of the number of chunks that had been learned through the study of game 
positions.   
 What processes allow strong players to perform better than weak players 
with random positions?   We have suggested three possibilities: (1) a large 
database of chunks in LTM, occasionally allowing the recognition of stored 
patterns that occur by chance in random positions; (2) the possession of strategies 
for coping with uncommon positions; (3) better knowledge of the topology of the 
chessboard. We have just seen that the first hypothesis is supported by computer 
simulation.  We are aware of no specific evidence for the second hypothesis.  The 
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third hypothesis, of better knowledge of the topology of the board, is supported by 
Saariluoma’s (1991) data, which show that Masters are better than novices at 
deciding whether a square, denoted by its algebraic notation (e.g. “e4”) is White 
or Black. Following this hypothesis, Masters possess chunks of squares (with or 
without pieces on them), that may be used in random positions to organize 
patterns of pieces. For example, Masters may know that the squares “a1” and “c2” 
are at a Knight’s distance, and may use this schema of squares to encode the 
pattern “White Pawn a1, Black Pawn c2,” even though, because the rules of the 
game prohibit Pawns on the first rank, they are not likely  to have learned  this 
precise chunk through past experience. 
 
 In this paper, we have reviewed several chess recall studies that used 
random positions as a control task, with a presentation time ranging from three to 
ten seconds. We found that, contrary to the general opinion, the recall of random 
position varies somewhat as a function of chess skill; and we proposed an 
explanation of this effect that is supported by our computer simulations.  
Although the absolute difference between skill levels is small, its presence rules 
out some theoretical accounts of chess expertise that have been proposed as 
alternatives to the chunking theory. Without an ad hoc assumption, perhaps 
familiarity with chess material, it is hard to see how theories of chess skill based 
mainly on level of processing (Lane & Robertson, 1979) or high-level knowledge 
(Cooke et al., 1993) can account for this observed, if modest, effect with random 
positions. By accessing chunks (not information at a "deeper level") already stored 
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in LTM, our computer model of the expert occasionally detects and recalls 
adventitious patterns on the random boards. The level-of-processing theory would 
require accessing "higher knowledge" in LTM, but it is not obvious what "higher 
knowledge" could  be used in recalling random positions, which, by construction, 
have no deeper structure.  
 As with chess, most studies on experts’ memory in other tasks have used 
small numbers of subjects (Charness, 1988; Gobet, 1993). It is a question for 
future research whether the lack of difference between experts and non-experts 
found in various domains of expertise when random material was used is genuine 
or is due to the low power of the experimental design used in these studies.  
 Taken together with results on the memory for sequence of pitch symbols 
(Sloboda, 1976) and for dance sequences (Allard & Starkes, 1991), the studies 
reviewed in this paper indicate that the relation between expertise and 
“meaningless” material taken from the domain of expertise may be somewhat 
more complex than has been thought previously, but that the notion of chunking is 
able to account for most of the phenomena, quantitatively as well as qualitatively.  
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Footnotes 
 
1Chess players are ranked according to the ELO rating, an interval scale used 
internationally. Grandmasters are usually rated above 2500 ELO, International 
Masters above 2400, Masters between 2200 and 2400, Experts between 2000 and 
2200, Class A players between 1800 and 2000, Class B players between 1600 and 
1800, and so on. The ratings of the US Chess Federation (USCF) are slightly 
higher than international ELO ratings. Given the large interval classes we will use 
in this paper, we may ignore the latter difference. 
2Lories’ study is difficult to interpret because the positions he used, taken from 
Holding and Reynolds (1982), are not really random. Some (semantic) constraints 
were applied in generating the positions, such as no Pawn on the first or eighth 
rank or no piece attacked without being defended. As a matter of fact, a statistical 
analysis shows that equiprobability of White and Black pieces’ distribution on the 
board may be rejected at p< .001 (Gobet, 1993).  
3When the range was given instead of the mean number of pieces per position in 
the description of the experiment, we took the range midpoint. 
4Though the patterns are produced by chance, they will be recognized if already 
stored in memory, analogous to noticing thirteen spades in a hand dealt at bridge. 
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 1. Mean number of pieces placed correctly as a function of type of 
positions (game or random) and skill level. 
 
< 1600 1600-2000 2000-2350 > 2350
0
5
10
15
20
25
Game
Random
Skill level (in ELO points)
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f p
ie
ce
s 
co
rr
ec
t
  Skilled chessplayers and random positions 
  20 
Table 1 
Number of pieces correctly replaced for random positions as a function of skill in thirteen experiments. For each 
experiment, the table lists, in order: the source, the number of subjects, the presentation time in seconds, the 
reconstruction mode, and the number of pieces correctly replaced.  
 
 
 Source                             N of            Presen-    Recons-        Mean Rating (in Elo points)a 
                                 subjects          tation        truction 
                   Time         Mode 
              (in seconds) 
      
<1600 
 
1600-2000 
 
2000-2350 
 
>2350 
        
bh
   Chase & Simon (1973a) 3 5 board 3.0 2.5  2.0 
bh
   Frey & Adesman (1976) 13 8 board 2.0 2.5    
di
   Saariluoma (1984), exp. 3 4 5 board 2.4 3.8   
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d
   Saariluoma (1984), exp. 4 4 5 board 2.5  5.0  7.3 
dh   Saariluoma (1985), exp. 3 9  5 ? 2.6 3.8 4.6  
ech
  Gold & Opwis (1992) 40 10 board 3.0 4.3    
dfh
   Saariluoma (1994), exp. 1 12 5 board 3.0  5.8  
edh
  Saariluoma (1994), exp.  2 9  3 verbal 2.4 3.4 4.8  
dh
  Saariluoma (1994), exp.  3 8 5 verbal 2.4  6.0  
dgh
  Saariluoma (1994), exp.  4 10 3 verbal 2.4 2.9   
cg   Gobet & Simon (1995), exp. 1 21 5 computer  3.4 5.2 8.4 
c   Gobet & Simon (in press-a), exp. 1 13 5 computer  3.0 4.0 5.2 
c
   Gobet & Simon (in press-b), exp. 2 25 5 computer  3.1 3.4 3.6 
(End of Table 1) 
 
a
 The  group mean rating is used for classification 
b
 USCF rating is used 
c
 International rating, or equivalent, is used 
d
 Finnish rating is used 
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e The difference between skill levels is significant at the .05 level. 
f This corrects an error in Saariluoma's (1994) figure 2, where the labels for the TT and random positions have been 
swapped (Saariluoma, 1995, personal communication).  
g
 The experiment used other presentation times as well. 
h
 Values estimated from graph 
i
 Experimental conditions with 20 and 25 pieces pooled. 
 
 
